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Abstract. Jean-Paul sartre is rarely discussed in the philosophy of religion. 
In 2009, however, Jerome Gellman broke the silence, publishing an article in 
this journal in which he argued that the source of sartre’s atheism was neither 
philosophical nor existential, but mystical. Drawing from several of sartre’s 
works  – including Being and Nothingness, Words, and a  1943 review entitled 
‘A New mystic’ – I argue that there are strong biographical and philosophical 
reasons to disagree with Gellman’s conclusion that sartre was a ‘mystical atheist’. 
moreover, I  question the likelihood of drawing any definitive conclusions 
regarding the sources of sartre’s ambiguous atheism.
Given his status as one of the best-known atheists of the twentieth century, 
it is hardly surprising that little research has been dedicated to sartre 
and mysticism. It is an area, however, that deserves greater scholarly 
attention. To date there have only been two brief studies published in 
english: a  chapter in Jacques salvan’s 1967 The Scandalous Ghost and 
a more recent contribution from Jerome Gellman in 2009 – an article 
in this journal in which he argues that sartre was a  ‘mystical atheist’.1 
Though he is not the first to apply this epithet to sartre,2 Gellman finds so 
much evidence in favour of mysticism in sartre’s works as to suggest that 
the latter’s atheism is neither philosophical nor existential, but mystical – 
that is, rooted in a mystical experience of the non-existence of God.
1 one might also wish to include Hazel barnes’ introduction to Being and Nothingness, 
which includes a  brief comparison of sartre’s ontology and mysticism. Though not 
explicitly devoted to mysticism, there are notable works on sartre and the sacred (King 
1974) and Christian thinkers such as Aquinas (Wang 2009); and in French, Jeanson’s 
Sartre devant Dieu (2005).
2 salvan notes that others have christened sartre as such (1967: 134).
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This paper seeks to assess this claim, first by inspecting Gellman’s 
readings of sartre’s texts; and second by assessing those passages where 
sartre explicitly treats mysticism. What emerges is neither mystical 
atheism nor mystical antipathy, but a  kind of mystical ambivalence: 
a question still hanging in the air.
I. GellmAN’s PorTrAIT: THe mYsTICAl ATHeIsT
Gellman bases his claim for sartre’s ‘mystical atheism’ on two textual 
foundations:
(1) an account sartre gives in both his autobiography Words and 
a  later conversation with beauvoir, in which sartre describes 
having had a ‘momentary intuition’ that God does not exist; and
(2) the ostensibly mystical language employed by sartre in describing 
the experiences of roquentin, the protagonist of his first published 
novel, Nausea. Although scholars dispute the extent to which this 
is the case, sartre claims in Words that he ‘was roquentin’, that he 
used this character to show ‘the texture of [his] life’, and Gellman 
accepts this equation of creator and created.3
Constraints of space prohibit considering the second of these at great 
length. For now suffice it to say that though sartre’s literary works are 
indeed full of mystic-like language  – of moments of ‘vision’, ‘seeing’, 
‘unveiling’, and ‘revelation’ – these metaphors do not necessarily imply 
mysticism. on sartre’s philosophical view of literature the author 
is a  ‘revealer’ (Wl4 27) of everyday existence and every written word 
a  ‘disclosure’ (Wl 14) of meaning. but to conduct a  thorough study 
of this language would distract us from our main project: ascertaining 
whether sartre’s atheism should properly be called ‘mystical’. so instead 
we shall turn to sartre’s ‘momentary intuition’ of God’s non-existence.
Gellman cites the version of the story given in the conversation with 
beauvoir, published posthumously in Adieux (rather than the one given 
in Words). In it we read the following:
When I was about twelve [...] in the morning I used to take the tram 
with the girls next door [...] one day I was walking up and down outside 
their house for a few minutes waiting for them to get ready. I don’t know 
where the thought came from or how it struck me, yet all at once I said 
to myself, ‘God doesn’t exist.’ [...] As I remember very well, it was on that 
3 Gellman 2009: 132–6.
4 All references to texts by sartre use the abbreviations listed in the bibliography.
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day and in the form of a momentary intuition that I said to myself, ‘God 
does not exist’. (beauvoir 1984: 437)
This description might be sufficient for some to justify the conclusion 
that sartre was ‘a  mystical atheist’. Indeed, the philosopher of religion 
might wish to point out that it does display several of William James’ 
famous four ‘marks’ which justify calling an experience mystical  – 
perhaps not the ineffability, but the noetic, transience, and passivity 
criteria seem to be met.5 on Gellman’s own definition  – as provided 
in his article and elsewhere in his entries on mysticism in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Religion, for example – sartre’s experience qualifies as mystical because it 
is a ‘unitive experience granting knowledge of realities or states of affairs 
that are of a  kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somato-
sensory modalities, or standard introspection’.6
What the sartre scholar is likely to find problematic is that this 
account is not the only story sartre tells about the origins of his unbelief. 
In fact, in Words alone sartre recounts three – attributing his unbelief, 
first, not to ‘conflicting dogma’ but his ‘grandparents’ indifference’ (W 
64). A page later we read a second account, a famous passage expressing 
indignation at being subject to God’s gaze:
once I had the feeling that He existed. I had been playing with matches 
and had burnt a mat; I was busy covering up my crime when suddenly 
God saw me. I felt His gaze inside my head and on my hands; I turned 
round and round in the bathroom, horribly visible, a living target. I was 
saved by indignation: I  grew angry at such a  crude lack of tact, and 
blasphemed, muttering like my grandfather: ‘Sacré nom de Dieu de nom 
de Dieu de nom de Dieu.’ He never looked at me again. (W 65)
Then there is the third tale, which Gellman considers, of sartre waiting 
for his childhood companions. And though it is less explicitly presented 
as an account of atheist origins, one might also wish to include a fourth 
genesis myth  – where sartre states outright that in his childhood he 
‘glimpsed evil, the absence of God’ following the death of a child (W 142). 
even a throw-away line in Being and Nothingness – which intriguingly 
refers to a ‘mystic crisis in my fifteenth year’ – might be a fifth (bN 520).
The point of this catalogue is that  – leaving aside sartre’s rhetorical 
tendencies and the debates about the reliability of autobiography in general 
5 James 1929: lectures 16 and 17.
6 Cited in Gellman 2009: 133.
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and Words in particular – it paints a rather more ambiguous portrait than 
Gellman presents. It seems more likely to this reader that, as Anthony 
Flew writes, ‘multiple factors combine in the creation of convictions’.7
Though he does not refer to these alternative histories, Gellman 
does mention the proof sartre offers for God’s non-existence in Being 
and Nothingness and a  later discussion of it with beauvoir, which 
was published after sartre’s death in Adieux.8 The proof is simple: on 
sartre’s ontology, nothing can be both in-itself and for-itself, so God is 
impossible. It is an ontological argument for God’s non-existence: Quod 
erat demonstrandum. but in dialogue with beauvoir sartre acknowledges 
that in Being and Nothingness he ‘set out reasons for [his] denial of 
God’s existence that were not actually the real reasons’, saying that the 
real reasons were ‘much more direct and childish’ (beauvoir 1984: 438). 
It is in this context that he re-tells the tale of the intuitive moment of 
God’s non-existence, elaborating that at the age of twelve he looked on 
this experience as ‘a  manifest truth that had come to me without any 
foregoing thought. That was obviously untrue’, he continues, ‘but it was 
how I always saw it – a thought that came suddenly, an intuition that rose 
up and that determined my life’.9
It is the dismissive inclusion of ‘that was obviously untrue’ that piques 
my curiosity, and may challenge Gellman’s interpretation. While sartre 
does give prominence to the version Gellman cites in Adieux, elsewhere 
he notes that ‘it is not unusual for the memory to condense into a single 
mythical moment the contingencies and perpetual rebeginnings of an 
individual history’ (G 1). And in Adieux itself his momentary intuition 
was deemed untrue. but why? What about this is ‘obviously untrue’? In 
order to answer this question, we shall now turn to see what we can glean 
from sartre’s writings on the subject of mysticism.
II. IN sArTre’s WorDs: mYsTICAl ANTIPATHIsT?
First, it is important to remember sartre’s context: in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, France underwent a  renaissance of 
mysticism. bergson’s Matter and Memory was published in 1897, and l’abbé 
bremond’s influential study of mysticism in France – Histoire littéraire 
du sentiment religieux en France (published in eleven volumes between 
7 Flew 2007: 11.
8 Gellman 2009: 132.
9 beauvoir 1984: 434, emphasis added.
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1916 and 1933), as well as other currents of mysticism  – from Péguy, 
Claudel, and bernanos, among others – were part of the intellectual soil 
in which sartre’s ideas took root.10 We know from beauvoir that sartre 
‘took an interest in the psychology of mysticism’ in the 1930s, which 
prompted beauvoir herself to read the likes of Catherine emmerich and 
saint Angela of Foligno.11
but what does the word ‘mysticism’ mean when it flows from sartre’s 
pen? In Words he refers to his youthful self as a ‘militant and a mystic’ 
(W 154f.), and as ‘prey to two opposing mystical theologies’ (W 108). 
mysticism, he writes, ‘suits displaced persons and superfluous children 
[...]’ (W 63); it does not seem to be the purview of the enlightened, 
autonomous philosopher but rather a naïve state of intellectual minority. 
When contemporary critic Émile bouvier applied the word to him sartre 
was astonished, writing in his War Diaries: ‘I’d never have believed that 
anyone would consign me to mysticism.’ (WD 158)
This reading is supported by the work which gives the clearest 
picture we have of sartre’s view of mysticism. In 1943, the same year 
in which Being and Nothingness appeared, sartre published a review of 
Georges bataille’s Inner Experience, labelling its author ‘a  new mystic’ 
whose undertaking was ‘an adventure beyond philosophy’. Here sartre is 
emphatic that mystical illumination leads, as Kant put it in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, to the ‘death of all philosophy’.
As Cardinal Newman wryly observed, mysticism ‘begins in mist and 
ends in schism’: and the schism between philosophy and other, mistier 
‘modes of knowing’ has a long and complicated history.12 Indeed, William 
James comments that the word ‘mysticism’ and its cognates are often 
employed as terms of reproach, rebuttals ‘to throw at any opinion which 
we regard as vague and vast and sentimental, and without a base in either 
facts or logic’.13 A case in point – and penned by an author who exerted 
considerable influence on sartre – is André Gide’s definition of mysticism 
as ‘whatever presupposes and demands the abdication of reason’.14
10 see Copleston 1974: 210ff. on bergson; see Connor 2000: 16, 19–20 on the 
intellectual climate in France. This notion of mysticism as departure from reason was 
particularly important in the 1930s, when the word ‘mysticism’ took on connotations 
of National socialism. It was the antiphilosophy: where philosophy emphasizes doubt 
and critical reflection, mysticism was a kind of being carried away, often against reason 
(Connor 2000: 129).
11 beauvoir 1962: 51.
12 see Connor 2000: 31.
13 James 1929: 370.
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In14‘A  New mystic’ sartre’s usage stands in this tradition: as Peter 
Tracey Connor writes, ‘When sartre calls bataille a mystic in 1943, the 
meaning of the term is fairly clear, for he is using it in a colloquial (and 
dismissive) sense, to refer to one who has substituted for reason some 
form of intuition or revelation.’15 Though a strong case is made by Amy 
Hollywood for reading the review as part of a  post-War campaign to 
purge the French literary scene of impurities, on my reading this is not 
the only dynamic at play. sartre criticizes bataille’s style and his method. 
The former, he writes, ‘is close to choking or drowning in its efforts to 
render the gasping suffocations of ecstasy or anguish’ (Nm 224). And as 
for the latter, it is a failed attempt at a synthesis of ‘rapture’ and ‘rigorous 
intellectual method’ (Nm 223). bataille believes that conviction ‘does 
not arise from reasoning, but only from the feelings which it defines’ 
(cited in Nm 223), but sartre dismisses bataille’s syllogisms as proofs 
‘supplied by an orator, jealous lover, barrister or madman’ (Nm 223). In 
case there was any possibility that his reader might think it possible to be 
both ‘mystic’ and ‘philosopher’ simultaneously, sartre puts the final nail 
in that coffin, writing that bataille is ‘neither a scholar nor a philosopher, 
[though he] has, unfortunately, a smattering of science and philosophy’ 
(Nm 240). No: ‘it is for the mystic’s apprentice that m. bataille writes’ 
(Nm 232), and his offering is ‘a little holocaust of philosophical words. 
What happens when he uses one of them? Its meaning curdles and turns 
like milk in the heat’ (Nm 239).
In addition to his adulterations of words, sartre takes offence at 
the idea that bataille claims some privileged access to knowledge – or 
rather, non-knowledge. Inner Experience is, ‘like most mystical writings, 
the product of a re-descent. m. bataille is returning from an unknown 
region; he is coming back down among us’ (Nm 230). ‘He is on high, we 
are down below. He delivers a message and it is for us to receive it if we 
can.’ (Nm 233)
moreover, it is not just the style of the message, nor the means of 
the delivery that sartre takes issue with. It is also the content. but by 
refusing to be reduced to argument, the mystic evades responsibility for 
any particular position – which is particularly problematic for some of 
the claims bataille proceeds to make concerning the absence of God.
14 Gide 1967: 414.
15 Connor 2000: 26
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‘mysticism’, as sartre eventually defines it, ‘is ek-stasis or, in other 
words, a wresting from oneself towards, and intuitive enjoyment of, the 
transcendent.’ but, sartre asks, ‘How can a thinker who has just asserted 
the absence of any transcendence achieve, in and by that very move, 
a mystical experience?’ That is the question he believes bataille must – 
yet fails to – answer (Nm 274). on this topic it is worth quoting at length 
from sartre’s review:
There are people you might call survivors. early on, they lost a beloved 
person  – father, friend, or mistress  – and their lives are merely the 
gloomy aftermath of that death. monsieur bataille is a  survivor of 
the death of God. And, when one thinks about it, it would seem that 
our entire age is surviving that death, which he experienced, suffered, 
and survived. God is dead. We should not understand by that that He 
does not exist, nor even that he now no longer exists. He is dead: he 
used to speak to us and he has fallen silent, we now touch only his 
corpse. Perhaps he has slipped out of this world to some other place, 
like a dead man’s soul. Perhaps all this was merely a dream. (Nm 234) 
God is dead, but man has not, for all that, become atheistic. Today, as 
yesterday, this silence of the transcendent, combined with modern man’s 
enduring religious need, is the great question of the age. (Nm 235)
The problem, then, which sartre poses to bataille is this (and, indeed, it 
is a question which might be asked of Gellman): how can one deny the 
transcendent and yet affirm mysticism?
lest it be thought that sartre’s view of mysticism in ‘A New mystic’ 
is idiosyncratic amongst his works, it must be pointed out that in Being 
and Nothingness, sartre uses the word ‘mystic’ to indicate fallacious, 
misleading experience  – for example, of the kind by which humanity 
(mistakenly) arrives at the idea of God. This notion, God, ‘refers to an 
infinite series of mystic experiences of the presence of the other, the 
notion of God as omnipresent, infinite subject for whom I  exist’ (bN 
305). elsewhere in sartre’s opus mysticism is presented as a  human 
project as impossible as God himself – it is an effort at uniting the in-itself 
and for-itself.16 In short, in the few places where sartre’s philosophical 
writings address mysticism outright, they tend to do so in antipathy; it is 
the bedfellow of bad faith. but he nonetheless assigned mystics enough 
credit to read and study them, and even went so far as to say in What 
16 see, for example, sartre’s discussion of mysticism in Saint Genet (1963), which 
Gellman cites for part I of his article.
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is Literature? that ‘God, if he existed, would be as the mystics have seen 
him, in a situation in relationship to man’ (Wl 14).
In light of this, an objector may wish to dismiss sartre’s rejection 
of mysticism as a  category mistake. The examples given above are 
theistic; sartre didn’t know, perhaps, that ‘atheist mysticism’ was a viable 
alternative. but to suggest this is to assume that he rejects mysticism solely 
on account of its (supposed) content. For sartre, as an existentialist, the 
problem of content is inseparable from the problem of method. existence 
comes not only before essence, but before knowledge. sartre does object 
to theistic mysticism for content-related reasons: specifically, because it 
imposes categories on experience which are not present in the experience 
itself (phenomenologically). but this is also a methodological objection, 
and one which is no less applicable to ‘atheist’ mysticism. For a rationalist 
like sartre, a mystical experience of the absence of God is inconclusive at 
best (after all, a theist might interpret the same experience as evidence of 
the deus absconditus). The transcendent is silent, and that, as sartre puts 
it in the passage cited above, is ‘the great question of the age’ (Nm 235). 
When Gellman appeals to sartre’s use of ‘intuition’, ‘seeing’ or ‘unveiling’ 
as a mystical idiom, one therefore wonders whether the two are using 
the same words to speak different languages. Gellman takes these to 
be epistemological, equating sartre’s descriptions of phenomenological 
awareness with mystical experiences which grant knowledge. For sartre, 
however, phenomenological awareness should be pure consciousness, 
prior to epistemology.
There is a  further philosophical problem with interpreting sartre 
as an ‘atheist mystic’ in the manner Gellman does: to have a ‘defining’ 
experience – a single experience which determines the rest of one’s life – 
is directly at odds with sartre’s doctrine of radical freedom. on sartre’s 
existentialist account, there can be no foundational experiences, or at 
least no experiences with such profound dictatorial power as to eclipse 
freedom. Instead, the sartrean existentialist begins with free choices, 
and nothing else.
III. CoNClusIoN: mYsTICAl AmbIVAleNCe
It is clear from the foregoing that I believe it is problematic to call sartre 
‘a mystical atheist’ for both biographical and philosophical reasons. but 
Gellman asks a question – namely ‘what was the source, the basis, of 
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sartre’s atheism?’17 – which seems not to be satisfactorily answered by 
either response: neither mysticism nor philosophy can overturn all the 
stones. mysticism is a mischief-maker whose wrongs must be righted 
by philosophy.17
And yet, in sartre’s works, philosophy’s sovereignty does not seem 
so absolute: in the conversation with beauvoir mentioned above sartre 
says his real reasons for denying God’s existence were ‘much more direct 
and childish’ (beauvoir 1984: 438) than the argument given in Being and 
Nothingness. Is he, therefore, assigning them greater force? or is he, like 
Descartes in his Discourse on Method, lamenting the fact that ‘we have 
all been children before being men [... making it] almost impossible that 
our judgments should be so excellent or so solid as they would have 
been had we had complete use of our reason since our birth, and had 
we been guided by its means alone’?18 Given that sartre later called his 
intuition ‘obviously untrue’, and believes mysticism particularly suited 
to ‘displaced children’, if he is to be called a mystic he should at least be 
called a reluctant one.
Having said that, it is unlikely that any answer to Gellman’s question 
can be asserted with certainty. For sartre’s philosophical project does 
appeal to more than discursive reason. He did not confine himself to 
writing the treatise and syllogism, but used literature because atmosphere 
can convey things more powerfully than argument. but does that make 
him a mystic? In What is Literature? sartre writes that ‘thought conceals 
man’, and that on their own, arguments do not interest us. ‘but an 
argument that masks a tear –that is what we’re after.’19 If his conversation 
with beauvoir is to be taken at face value, sartre’s ontological disproof in 
Being and Nothingness is such an argument. but who can claim to know 
what tears it masks?20
17 Gellman 2009: 132.
18 Descartes 1969: I, 88.
19 Wl 22. sartre continues, ‘The argument removes the obscenity from the tears; 
the tears, by revealing their origin in the passions, remove the aggressiveness from the 
argument.’
20 This paper was presented and discussed at the annual conference of the mystical 
Theology Network – ‘mystical Theology: eruptions from France’ – held at All Hallows 
College, Dublin, in January 2013. I am grateful for comments from Pamela sue Anderson, 
George Pattison, and a reviewer for this journal, and for the support of the AHrC.
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